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INTRODUCTION
There is a conventional narrative surrounding the term
“exclusionary zoning.” It describes a particular phenomenon: a
suburb adopting large-lot zoning or other density controls that reduce
the supply of developable land, thereby driving up prices and making
This
housing unaffordable for lower-income households.1
phenomenon, in turn, generates a set of familiar worries about
municipalities not bearing their fair share of lower-income
households and imposing the associated costs on their neighbors and

* Professor of Law, Vanderbilt Law School. Thanks to Nestor Davidson for steering
us towards this topic. Thanks also to Nicole Tarpey and Ben Stark for early
discussions about the piece.
** J.D., Brooklyn Law School (2013); M.S., City and Regional Planning, Pratt
Institute (Expected 2014).
1. See, e.g., Alan Mallach, The Mount Laurel Doctrine and the Uncertainties of
Social Policy in a Time of Retrenchment, 63 RUTGERS L. REV. 849, 861 (2010)
(characterizing exclusionary zoning as a problem of suburban land use controls).
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in particular on the urban core.2 This relatively parochial frame,
however, misses some of the scales at which exclusion operates, and
therefore the forms that exclusionary zoning sometimes takes.
Expanding the frame reveals problems of exclusion not just at the
local level, but at the regional and sub-local levels as well.
Exclusionary zoning in its modern form is no longer limited to lowdensity suburbs, but now occurs also within the urban core and
region-wide.
Most responses to exclusionary zoning operate only on the local
scale to address the exclusion of lower-income households from
suburban municipalities.3 Most famously, the New Jersey Supreme
Court, in Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of
Mount Laurel, required municipalities to bear their fair share of
affordable housing need.4 New Jersey’s legislative response has
similarly focused on local governments’ fair share obligations.5 Other
states also have a local focus.6 Massachusetts, for example, gives
developers an exemption from local zoning if a municipality does not
meet a pre-determined affordable housing quota.7
These are appropriate responses to the conventional concern of
exclusionary zoning, which consists of a local government using
particular zoning techniques to force lower-income households into
neighboring municipalities. These tactics benefit the excluding
government’s tax rolls to the detriment of its neighbors. But an
exclusive focus on municipal-level exclusionary zoning misses other
important problems, namely: access by lower-income households to
public services and higher wages.
In contrast to the traditional focus on inter-local externalities, we
argue here that the problem of exclusionary zoning should be viewed
first and foremost from the perspective of lower-income households.8
2. See generally S. Burlington Cnty. NAACP v. Twp. of Mount Laurel, 336 A.2d
713 (N.J. 1975).
3. See infra text accompanying notes 28–31.
4. Mt. Laurel, 336 A.2d at 731–32.
5. See, e.g., Mallach, supra note 1, at 850 (discussing the legislation establishing
New Jersey’s Council on Affordable Housing, the state agency tasked with
monitoring local government compliance with fair share obligations).
6. See STUART MECK ET AL., REGIONAL APPROACHES TO AFFORDABLE
HOUSING, AMERICAN PLANNING ASSOCIATION (2003) (describing the fair share
approaches adopted in New Jersey, California, Oregon and New Hampshire).
7. Massachusetts Low and Middle Income Housing Act, MASS. GEN. LAWS ch.
40B, §§ 20–23 (2002).
8. See, e.g., Norman Williams, Planning Law and Democratic Living, 20 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 317, 345 (1955). Williams divides the problem of exclusionary
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As a group, they have needs at different geographical scales. They
need access to regions where employment opportunities are available
and wages are high relative to costs of living. They need access to
municipalities that offer an attractive mix of services and taxation.
And they need housing opportunities in specific neighborhoods that
are not isolated from core public services. Exclusionary zoning can
operate in each of these spatial frames independently of one another.
The long-standing focus of exclusionary zoning on the content of local
ordinances, instead of on these broader exclusionary dynamics, has
defined the problem of exclusionary zoning too narrowly. We aim to
remedy that deficiency in our contribution to the Fordham Urban
Law Journal’s Fortieth Anniversary issue.
In Part I we describe traditional accounts of exclusionary zoning.
In Part II, we explore the different geographical scales at which
exclusion can operate and the varied forms exclusion can take.
Finally, in Part III, we discuss the need for more finely-tuned judicial
interventions to comprehensively address exclusion in its many forms.
I. THE LOCAL FOCUS OF EXCLUSIONARY ZONING
Contemporary concerns about exclusionary zoning are intimately
bound up with Twentieth Century suburbanization.9 In the 1940s,
middle- and upper-income households increasingly took advantage of
improvements in transportation infrastructure to build and buy
houses farther and farther outside the urban core.10 Simultaneously,
those newly developing suburbs enacted restrictive zoning ordinances
that excluded or limited affordable housing options for lower-income
households.11

zoning into two key components—the improper burden shifting among local
governments and the relegation of lower-income groups to “slum housing.” Id.
Williams’ overarching premise is that various forms of exclusion limit spontaneous
contact across racial, ethnic, and economic lines, harming our system of democratic
government. Id. at 348.
9. Suburbanization does not refer to only one phenomenon. See Wayne Batchis,

Suburbanization and Constitutional Interpretation: Exclusionary Zoning and the
Supreme Court Legacy of Enabling Sprawl, 8 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 1, 7 (2012) (“Over
the course of American history, the meaning of ‘urban’ and ‘suburban’ have shifted
in accordance with technological capacity and social proclivities.”).
10. See id. at 18–20 (describing post-war suburbanization). Some scholars have
observed how the proliferation of exclusionary devices tracked the expansion of the
interstate highway system. See, e.g., William A. Fischel, An Economic History of
Zoning and a Cure for its Exclusionary Effect, 41 URB. STUD. 317, 319 (2004).
11. See James C. Quinn, Challenging Exclusionary Zoning: Contrasting Recent
Federal and State Court Approaches, 4 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 147, 147 (1975) (noting
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In addition to blatant discrimination, there are fiscal reasons for
exclusionary zoning that are easily observable and well developed in
the academic literature.12 Where public services are funded in
significant part by property taxes, owners of lower-valued housing
contribute less to those services, receiving an implicit subsidy from
owners of higher valued property.13 The effect is exacerbated if
owners of lower-valued property also “consume” more than the
average amount of public services by, for example, having more
children in the public school. The availability of lower-valued
property in a municipality can therefore present tough choices to
existing property owners: either pay more in property taxes, or accept
cutbacks in the level of public services.14 Neither is very appealing, so
existing property owners have a significant incentive to use “fiscal
zoning” to keep out owners of lower-valued property in order to
minimize, if not eliminate, the extent of the cross-subsidy from
owners of higher-valued to owners of lower-valued property.15

how municipalities facing suburban development pressures were most likely to adopt
exclusionary devices to preserve neighborhood character, and keep taxes and
demand for municipal services at low levels).
12. See, e.g., Bruce W. Hamilton, Property Taxes and the Tiebout Hypothesis:
Some Empirical Evidence, in FISCAL ZONING AND LAND USE CONTROLS 15 (Edwin
S. Mills & Wallace E. Oates eds., 1975); Rolf Pendall et al., Connecting Smart
Growth, Housing Affordability and Racial Equity, in THE GEOGRAPHY OF
OPPORTUNITY: RACE AND HOUSING CHOICE IN METROPOLITAN AMERICA 229–30
(Xavier de Souza Briggs ed., 2005) (noting positive justifications for zoning with
“exclusionary or expulsive impacts”); Henry A. Span, How Courts Should Fight
Exclusionary Zoning, 32 SETON HALL L. REV. 1, 18 (2001) (describing how
exclusionary zoning aligns taxes and services with preferences of residents). For an
example of uncommon candor about fiscal concerns, see S. Burlington Cnty NAACP
v. Twp. of Mount Laurel, 336 A.2d 713, 723 (1975) (acknowledging purpose of
exclusionary zoning to protect the local tax base).
13. Span, supra note 12, at 18–19 (describing fiscal zoning, which can produce
exclusionary outcomes as residents attempt to limit entry to those “who will pay
more in property taxes than they will consume in municipal services”).
14. See, e.g., WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, THE HOMEVOTER HYPOTHESIS: HOW HOME
VALUES INFLUENCE LOCAL GOVERNMENT TAXATION, SCHOOL FINANCE, AND LANDUSE POLICIES (2001).
15. While this traditional account of exclusionary zoning is focused primarily on
the relationship between exclusionary devices and the preservation of property
values, scholars have also highlighted the preservation of neighborhood character as
an underlying motivation for exclusionary zoning. See, e.g., Lawrence G. Sager, Tight
Little Islands: Exclusionary Zoning, Equal Protection, and the Indigent, 21 STAN. L.
REV. 767, 797 (1969).
Neighborhood character, however, is an ambiguous
motivation, and as legal scholar Norman Williams Jr. pointed out, it may be “merely
another way of [residents] saying . . . they want economic segregation.” Williams,
supra note 8, at 344; see also Stephen Sussna, Residential Densities: A Patchwork
Placebo, 1 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 127, 133–34 (1972) (detailing the many justifications
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Early writing in this journal described the tangible impacts that
resulted from this appetite for exclusionary devices.16 Large-lot
zoning was ubiquitous across suburbs that developed around major
cities like New York and Saint Louis.17 In fact, in the late 1960s,
Missouri had a four-year supply of one-third acre lots, but a stunning
350-year supply of one-acre lots.18 These figures reflect an obvious
and significant barrier to new affordable housing development during
that period.
To make matters worse, the political calculation tends to be
weighted strongly against affordable housing. The burden of housing
price increases is felt primarily by people who are excluded from the
municipality—people who are prevented from ever moving in the
first place, or who are forced to move out because they cannot afford
higher rents. Neither constituency is likely to have much political
influence,19 and the former is unlikely even to self-identify as a
constituency. Therefore, local politicians’ incentives tend to be
dominated in these matters by the interests of local homeowners, who
are primarily concerned with maximizing local property values.20
These dynamics led to obvious and predictable outcomes
throughout the latter half of the twentieth century. People who could
afford to do so began leaving cities en masse, increasing property
values and the tax base in suburbs while relegating an increasingly
poor population to the inner cities.21 This “white flight” had a
pernicious racial aspect, segregating cities and suburbs into minority

for exclusionary zoning, including the aesthetic preferences for large lots that drove
many Americans to leave urban areas). Some state courts have rejected the
preservation of neighborhood character as a basis for restrictive land use controls.
See generally Jeffrey M. Lehmann, Reversing Judicial Deference Toward
Exclusionary Zoning: A Suggested Approach, 12 J. AFFORDABLE HOUSING &
COMMUNITY DEV. L. 229 (2003) (describing how state courts evaluate community
character justifications, and providing recommendations for when such justifications
should be categorically rejected).
16. See, e.g., Quinn, supra note 11, at 147–48; Sussna, supra note 15, at 134.
17. Sussna, supra note 15, at 132 (citing Note, Exclusionary Zoning and Equal
Protection, 84 HARV. L. REV. 1645, 1645 n.5 (1971)).
18. Id.
19. See Robert C. Ellickson, Suburban Growth Controls: An Economic and Legal
Analysis, 86 YALE. L.J. 385, 402 (1977).
20. FISCHEL, supra note 14.
21. See, e.g., S. Burlington Cnty. NAACP v. Twp. of Mount Laurel, 336 A.2d 713,
735–36 (N.J. 1975) (citing NAT’L COMM’N ON URBAN PROBLEMS, BUILDING THE
AMERICAN CITY, H.R. Doc. No. 34 (1968)).
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and white populations respectively.22 Cities then faced the dual
pressures of a declining tax base and increased demand on public
services.23
In the competition between cities and suburbs,
exclusionary zoning was a powerful tool to protect the suburban tax
base and keep cities poor.
Affordable housing, in this view, presents a kind of NIMBY (Not
in My Backyard) problem. Every region needs some low-wage
workers—whether in service, manufacturing, or government sectors
of the regional economy—but no particular municipality wants to
house them. Likewise, every region has a dependent population that
requires some government support, but every municipality would
rather it be provided somewhere else. As the New Jersey Supreme
Court therefore recognized in Mt. Laurel, exclusionary zoning creates
a kind of inter-local externality, imposing costs on neighboring
communities forced to house a disproportionate share of lowerincome households.24 For example, Mount Laurel’s exclusionary
zoning was primarily to the detriment of Philadelphia, Camden and
Trenton, the nearby urban centers.25 But that same dynamic has
played out throughout the country, with suburbs enacting
exclusionary zoning ordinances that impose the costs of lower-income
households on to the urban core.
When people think or write about exclusionary zoning, then, they
often have this form of inter-local competition at least implicitly in
mind: suburbs using large-lot zoning and other density controls to

22. See, e.g., Scott J. South & Kyle D. Crowder, Escaping Distressed
Neighborhoods: Individual, Community, and Metropolitan Influences, 102 AM. J.
SOC. 1040 (1997) (explaining concurrent dynamics fueling racial segregation including
the difficulty racial minorities face exiting ghettos, and their ease of entry into
ghettos); Sussna, supra note 15, at 131 (describing “two distinct racial societies . . .
dangerously developing in the United States” as mostly white families fled urban
areas and percentage of blacks increased).
23. See ANTHONY DOWNS, OPENING UP THE SUBURBS: AN URBAN STRATEGY FOR
AMERICA 9–10 (1973) (describing how older, more affordable housing remained in
“central cities and some close-in suburbs,” which compelled “thousands of such
households to become concentrated in the worst urban housing”).
24. Mt. Laurel, 336 A.2d at 727–28 (“[T]he universal and constant need for such
housing is so important and of such broad public interest that the general welfare
which developing municipalities like Mount Laurel must consider extends beyond
their boundaries and cannot be parochially confined to the claimed good of the
particular municipality.”).
25. See, e.g., Linda H. Jones, Note, The Mount Laurel Case: A Question of
Remedies, 37 U. PITT. L. REV. 442, 443 (1975) (“Because of Mount Laurel’s proximity
to the urban centers of Camden, Trenton and Philadelphia, it is a likely place for
growth and for immigration from the nearby overcrowded urban centers.”).
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prevent affordable housing options, forcing lower-income households
to remain in the urban core.26 As a result, zoning ordinances
identified as “exclusionary” usually involve municipalities limiting
density and increasing infrastructure costs, either directly or
indirectly.27
What is often missing from the debates and discussion, however, is
recognition that exclusion happens at different geographical scales.
Regional and sub-local exclusion may be just as problematic as
exclusion at the municipal level.
II. THE SPATIAL DYNAMICS OF EXCLUSIONARY ZONING
Most writing and theorizing about the problem of exclusionary
zoning focuses on the geographic scale of the municipality or relevant
zoning authority.28 At first blush, this seems obviously “correct”
because responsibility for exclusionary zoning lies with the
government that enacted the zoning ordinance.
Moreover,
exclusionary zoning’s role in inter-local competition makes local
governments seem like the appropriate scale for analysis because
property taxes are collected and many public services—like schools—
are provided at the local level.29 The traditional concern, after all, is
with one local government avoiding its fair share of the costs of
lower-income households to the detriment of other municipalities.
The local focus is due in part to the fact that the most successful
legal challenges to exclusionary zoning have relied on this theory of
inter-local externalities and the unreasonable application of state
police power.30 In contrast, federal constitutional challenges by

26. In some cases, large lot zoning did not originate as an exclusionary device, but
rather, was a counter-response to the speculative real estate markets of the 1920s,
when far too many small lots were created. See Sussna, supra note 15, at 134.
27. See Quinn, supra note 11, at 148 n.9 (providing examples of common
exclusionary devices including minimum lot sizes and widths, exclusion of multifamily housing, restrictions on number of bedrooms in apartment developments, and
prohibitions on mobile homes).
28. See, e.g., Myron Orfield, Land Use and Housing Policies to Reduce
Concentrated Poverty and Racial Segregation, 33 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 877, 888–89
(2006) (describing exclusionary zoning as a problem originating with municipality,
using delegated powers to “serve only the perceived interest of that locality, without
consideration of the effect of their laws on the larger region”).
29. But see generally Nestor M. Davidson & Sheila R. Foster, The Mobility Case
for Regionalism, 47 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. (forthcoming 2013) (discussing regional
services and amenities).
30. See Britton v. Town of Chester, 595 A.2d. 492, 495–96 (N.H. 1991) (relying on
“general welfare clause” of New Hampshire’s zoning enabling statute to invalidate
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excluded residents, based on equal protection or access to housing,
have been largely unsuccessful.31 As a result, the spatial inquiry is
regularly confined to individual municipalities and inter-local
affordable housing burdens, rather than the experience of exclusion
by lower-income households at various scales. The question of scale,
however, is far less straightforward than it appears. When it comes to
affordable housing options, a lower-income household may be
relatively indifferent to local jurisdictional boundaries (subject to
some caveats, examined below). The question for the household is
simply whether there are affordable housing options in a safe
neighborhood with appropriate access to basic needs (jobs, schools,
services, medical care, and so forth). According to one account, the
focus should be on a broader “geography of advantage and
disadvantage: dangerous streets and safe ones, good schools and
failing ones.”32 Zoning is exclusionary to the extent that it limits or
eliminates such housing options. Judged by this broader criterion, the
problem of exclusionary zoning can occur at both the sub-local and
the regional level.
A. The Needs of Lower-Income Households
Traditional exclusionary zoning—as practiced at the municipal
level—is not the only form of residential exclusion. At the regional
level, lower-income households need the ability to move to

town’s large-lot zoning that served parochial interests of residents rather than
broader concerns); S. Burlington Cnty. NACP v. Twp. Of Mount Laurel, 336 A.2d
713, 713 (N.J. 1975); Berenson v. Town of New Castle, 341 N.E.2d 236, 242 (N.Y.
1975) (setting out two-part test for exclusionary zoning challenges, including whether
the ordinance gives due consideration “to regional needs and requirements”); Twp.
of Willistown v. Chesterdale Farms 341 A.2d 466 (Pa. 1975) (striking down ordinance
providing limited apartment development for failure to accommodate fair share of
multi-family development in the township).
31. See, e.g., Ybarra v. City of Los Altos Hills, 503 F.2d 250 (9th Cir. 1974)
(rejecting “poverty” as a basis for suspect classification).
32. Matthew Desmond & Tracey Shollenberger, Mechanisms of Neighborhood
Selection: Why and How Poor Families Move 3 (unpublished manuscript) (on file
with authors). This “residential attainment model” is one of several frameworks for
understanding the motivations underlying the spatial locations of lower-income
households. Id. (manuscript at 2–3). Here, moves from one locale to another are
driven by a desire for economic gains. Traditionally, this has taken the form of
minority and immigrant communities moving from urban areas to working class
neighborhoods, and ultimately to suburban communities. Id. (manuscript at 2–3)
(citing John R. Logan & Richard D. Alba, Locational Returns to Human Capital:
Minority Access to Suburban Community Resources, 30 DEMOGRAPHY 243, 244
(1993)).
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employment opportunities.33 Regional economies grow and stagnate.
In one decade, Detroit may be an engine of growth, another New
York or Nashville.34 It is important—for workers as well as for the
economy—that people be able to move to where the money and jobs
are, with limited barriers to entry.35 Such mobility decreases wage
differentials between regions, provides labor in places where jobs are
relatively plentiful and workers are needed, and offers a way up the
economic ladder for lower-income workers.36
There is, however, some evidence that inter-regional mobility is on
the decline, and some further evidence that one cause may be land
use controls—particularly land use controls enacted in higher-income
states.37 This is troubling as an economic phenomenon, and also poses
significant challenges to lower-income workers who may be unable to
access regions with higher wages. As a result, regional income
convergence has slowed, due at least in part to residential restrictions
limiting access to these more economically vibrant parts of the
country.38
But the problem of exclusion operates at the sub-local level as well.
Zoning, after all, can be used to protect well-to-do neighborhoods
and segregate lower-income households in discrete pockets within a
given municipality.
The phenomenon is widespread.39
The

33. Ann R. Tickamyer & Cynthia M. Duncan, Poverty and Opportunity Structure
in Rural America, 16 ANN. REV. SOC. 67, 79–81 (1990) (linking rural poverty to
limited opportunities for out-migration).
34. See Kim Severson, Nashville’s Latest Big Hit Could Be the City Itself, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 8, 2013, at A11.
35. See generally Davidson & Foster, supra note 29; Peter Ganong & Daniel
Shoag, Why Has Regional Income Convergence in the U.S. Stopped? (Harvard
Kennedy School Working Paper No. RWP12-028, 2013), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2081216.
36. Ganong & Shoag, supra note 35, at 2; see also ANDREW J. OSWALD, A
CONJECTURE ON THE EXPLANATION FOR HIGH UNEMPLOYMENT IN THE
INDUSTRIALIZED NATIONS: PART I (1996) (linking the mobility constraints associated
with growing homeownership rates to increased unemployment across western
economies); Audrey G. McFarlane, Race, Space and Place: The Geography of
Economic Development, 36 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 295, 334–36 (1999) (explaining how
limited mobility of poorer communities reduced access to jobs as positions moved to
the “ever-extending periphery of the metropolitan region”).
37. Ganong & Shoag, supra note 35, at 27 (“[T]ighter [land use] regulations
impede population flows to rich areas and weaken convergence in human capital.”).
38. Id.; cf. Span, supra note 12, at 19 (discussing the effect of traditional
exclusionary zoning as “isolat[ing] from employment those excluded from the
suburbs”).
39. Common interest communities, too, sometimes use fine-grained private land
use controls in their master deeds to exclude lower-income households. While this is
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revitalization of many cities from the 1980s through today is
characterized by increased power of individual communities retaking
control over zoning, services, and spending at the sub-local level in
order to break the downward spiral of the city more broadly that
characterized the previous decades.40 By asserting sub-local control
over services and even, in some cases, revenue (through TIFs, special
assessments, and the like), well-to-do neighborhoods within a
municipality can benefit by excluding lower-income households. But
this creates some of the same NIMBY pressure between
neighborhoods that exist between local governments, and many
neighborhoods have managed to secure zoning protection to prevent
new affordable development, either by asserting formal land use
authority at the sub-local level, or by successfully petitioning the local
zoning authority.41
Viewed exclusively through the lens of inter-local competition, sublocal exclusionary zoning should be of no concern. It does not matter
where municipalities provide housing for lower-income households,
so long as they accommodate their fair share. But this misses at least
some of the point. The ultimate goal is not—or at least is not

not typically viewed through the lens of exclusionary zoning, the effect in some
municipalities may well be to force lower-income households into very limited
housing options, with access to a public school and public services that are severely
underfunded relative to the common interest communities. See Lior Jacob
Strahilevitz, Exclusionary Amenities in Residential Communities, 92 VA. L. REV. 437,
442–43 (2006).
40. This has happened both formally and informally. Homeowners’ associations
amount to a kind of reclaiming of sub-local regulatory power. TIFs allow sub-local
communities to capture increased property tax revenue and divert it away from the
broader municipality. Less formally, too, city councils have become more responsive
to neighborhood demands, like downzoning built-out communities, which can limit
development potential. For theoretical proposals supporting these changes, see
generally Robert H. Nelson, Privatizing the Neighborhood: A Proposal to Replace
Zoning With Private Collective Property Rights to Existing Neighborhoods, 7 GEO.
MASON L. REV. 827 (1999).
41. Examples of sub-local land use control do not always involve zoning, but can
have the very same exclusionary effect. A leading example is the creation of
neighborhood conservation districts, which create the veto power of historic
preservation without the need for any historic significance. See generally William A.
Fischel, Neighborhood Conservation Districts, 78 BROOK. L. REV. 339 (2013); see also
Desmond & Shollenberger, supra note 32, (manuscript at 7) (explaining how even
incremental moves from one block to another can mean the difference between total
exclusion from community resources and capital to new opportunities for
advancement). The “considerable diversity of neighborhood context among the
urban poor,” suggests that sub-local inquiries are integral to the understanding of the
true sources upward mobility. Desmond & Shollenberger, supra note 32, (manuscript
at 7).
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exclusively—inter-municipal fairness for local governments’ budgets,
but must also include positive outcomes for the region’s (and the
nation’s) lower-income households.
Preventing traditional
exclusionary zoning at the municipal level can be important for
achieving this goal because it pushes back against ghettoization in the
urban core and the reduced public services available to households
that may need them the most. It is not, however, a panacea. Even if
local governments all bear their fair share of lower-income
households, those households may fare no better if they are then
segregated by municipal governments into sub-local slums and
provided with lower quality services.42
Importantly, then,
exclusionary zoning is not just the pernicious tool of suburbs in their
competition with the urban core (and each other), but also exists
within cities and larger municipalities. A city’s zoning can be
exclusionary when it protects well-to-do neighborhoods, and limits
housing for lower-income households.
Stepping back, then, the problem of exclusion replicates itself at
different scales. At the largest scale, it is concerned with the
distribution of lower-income households across the nation. At the
middle (traditional) scale, it is concerned with their distribution
within a region. And at the smallest scale, it is concerned with the
distribution of lower-income households at the neighborhood or even
the block or building level.
B. The Problem of Exclusion Reassessed
With this more comprehensive spatial frame comes some
important insights and legal conclusions—described below—but also
some new conceptual hurdles. It is simply not true, for instance, that
people should be able to live wherever they want. Problematizing
exclusion across spatial frames does not mean that Silicon Valley
should house a large share of the nation’s poor, nor that Park Avenue
or Beverly Hills should have a significant portion of their housing
stock dedicated to New York’s or Los Angeles’s lower-income
households. So how should exclusion be assessed?
The traditional focus on municipal exclusionary zoning contains
the seeds of an answer. In this account, zoning is a mechanism that
42. Scott A. Bollens, Concentrated Poverty and Metropolitan Equity Strategies, 8
STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 11, 11 (1997) (“Location of households and individuals in
segregated, poverty-stricken neighborhoods significantly influences the quality of
their schools, the level of municipal services, tax burdens, access to work, and level of
safety.”).
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well-to-do suburbs can use to limit the subsidy from owners of highervalued property to owners of lower-valued property.43 As outlined
above, local government actors generally seek to maximize local
property values, which requires maximizing the value of the public
services they offer—schools, infrastructure, etc.—while minimizing
property taxes. One way that a lower-income household can improve
its situation is by moving to a municipality with better public services,
at least so long as those public services are not fully reflected in that
household’s housing costs (including property taxes). A lowerincome household can benefit by buying lower-valued property in a
municipality offering higher-valued services.44 Exclusionary zoning is
problematic from the perspective of lower-income households, then,
if it constrains supply to an extent that the value of public services are
largely capitalized into housing costs.
Some might object that this is not a problem with zoning but,
instead, its most salutary feature. It goes some way to converting
local property taxes into user fees, offering the slate of services only
to those families willing and able to pay. By narrowing the range of
local property values, it narrows the subsidy available to people at the
lower end of that band.45 For purposes of this short Essay, we do not
set out to defend any one view of government, but simply assume that
local governments rely on property taxes instead of user fees partly
because some measure of redistribution is desirable. It is fair to ask
owners of more expensive property to bear a greater share of the
costs of public services, and it is appropriate for owners of lowervalued property to receive a kind of subsidy for the services they
consume.
We take no view here on the extent of subsidy that is normatively,
politically, or economically desirable. Constraining that subsidy to
some extent is clearly appropriate and is an important consequence if
not function of municipal land use controls. But those constraints can
43. Exclusionary zoning is traditionally discussed in terms of minimum lot
requirements, crafted to create economically homogenous suburban communities.
See, e.g., Alan Tarr & Russell S. Harrison, Legitimacy and Capacity in State Supreme
Court Policymaking: The New Jersey Court and Exclusionary Zoning, 15 RUTGERS
L.J. 513, 531 (1984) (presenting large-lot zoning as the dominant form of residential
exclusion).
44. See Hamilton, supra note 12, at 15 (describing how local governments
institute restrictive zoning to avoid dynamic of “musical suburbs,” where lowerincome households move to more affluent neighborhoods to access fiscal advantages
like better quality public services).
45. Id. at 13 (noting how homogeneous housing values promote economic
efficiency).
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go too far. Zoning is exclusionary when it crosses that line—
wherever it is drawn.
The important point for this Essay is that exclusionary outcomes
can repeat at the regional and sub-local levels as well. For a lowerincome household, accessing a municipality with good public services
is no help if those services are not available to everyone in the
community. The good schools may only be available to children in
wealthy neighborhoods, for example; police may provide different
levels of protection, and investments in public infrastructure may be
different as well.46 To the extent the value of these services is fully
capitalized into the cost of housing, there is little meaningful access
for lower-income households.
If this discussion seems esoteric, consider public schools. Anyone
who has shopped for a house knows that the quality of the zoned
public school translates into higher home values. If the “full” value of
that school is reflected in property values, then it provides little actual
access for lower-income households. In fact, school districting is
often hard-fought.47 True, even the most desirable public schools
often draw from some less expensive neighborhoods, but the issue is
how many affordable housing options are actually available. Too
many options, of course, and the quality of the school may decrease,
but with too few, the school district starts to look inappropriately
exclusionary. Again, our purpose in this Essay is not to suggest where
that line is drawn but is simply to recognize the dynamic of sub-local
exclusion.
It is possible that sub-local exclusionary zoning is less problematic
than municipal exclusionary zoning if all residents are, in fact, able to
access municipal services equally. A suburb that has only one public
school will not be able to zone out lower-income residents from that
school, but in larger jurisdictions and urban areas the opportunity for
sub-local exclusion clearly exists. Indeed, the cycle of poor services
and low property values is replicated at the sub-local level in many
cities.
In New York City, parents are well aware of the

46. There are other legal doctrines that prohibit discrimination in the provision of
local services, but they are often weakly enforced. See, e.g., Mount Prospect State
Bank v. Vill. of Kirkland, 467 N.E.2d 1142 (Ill. App. Ct. 1984), cited in LYNN A.
BAKER & CLAYTON P. GILLETTE, LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW (4th ed. 2010)
(reproducing case in a discussion of discrimination in public services).
47. See, e.g., Benjamin Zimmer, A Deregulatory Framework for Alleviating
Concentrated African-American Poverty, 9 HASTINGS RACE & POVERTY L.J. 555, 569
(2012) (detailing “[the] strong incentive for residents in any school district to
preclude the development of housing of lower value than their own”).
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neighborhoods with “good” schools and, at least in the last few years,
the Bloomberg administration has used its zoning power aggressively
to maintain property values in those more affluent parts of the city.48
Residents of a subsidized housing development may be able to send
their children to the same public school and access the same police
protection as residents in the wealthy parts of town. But maybe not.
It depends entirely on the municipality and how services are
distributed within its borders.
Political pressure at the sub-local level may increase the likelihood
of sub-local exclusion.49 Wealthy neighborhoods may exercise
disproportionate power on the local zoning authority and seek to
preserve property values, severely curtailing affordability. They may
also fight to keep school zone boundaries tightly correlated to
neighborhood affluence.50
And, even when a municipality is
committed to equalizing public expenditures across schools, active
parent involvement in fundraising—often through PTAs—can
dramatically affect the relative resources of different schools in the
same jurisdiction.51
If a municipality has the ability—formally or informally—to
discriminate between neighborhoods in the provision of services, then
sub-local exclusionary zoning implicates problems that are very
similar to traditional exclusionary zoning at the municipal level. Both

48. See AMY ARMSTRONG ET AL., HOW HAVE RECENT REZONINGS AFFECTED
CITY’S
ABILITY
TO
GROW?
10
(2010),
available
at
http://furmancenter.org/files/publications/Rezonings_Furman_Center_Policy_Brief_
March_2010.pdf (“[U]pzoned lots were located in areas with significantly lower
income than the City median . . . .”). This happens internationally, too, and often
with pernicious effects. In Romania, many Roma (gypsies), live in discrete
communities and are provided their own schools so as not to “burden” public
schools. This is sub-local exclusion, and the results are little different than if they
were forced to live in their own towns. For a compelling account, see OUR SCHOOL
(Sat Mic Films, 2011).
49. See David Schleicher, City Unplanning, 122 YALE L.J. 1670, 1699–1705 (2013)
(offering account of local political dynamics that identifies sublocal pressures).
50. See, e.g., Spurlock v. Fox, 716 F.3d 383 (6th Cir. 2013) (upholding Metro
Nashville Rezoning Plan, which was challenged on grounds that it perpetuated
“racially isolated geographical zones” by aligning school districts with neighborhood
boundaries, rather than using non-contiguous zones to foster more integrated
districts).
51. PTAs in high-income New York City neighborhoods like the Upper West
Side of Manhattan regularly raise almost one million dollars per year for the local
public elementary school, allowing the school to support a range of enrichment
programs unavailable to schools with a less affluent base of parents. See Kyle
Spencer, Way Beyond Bake Sales: The $1 Million PTA, N.Y. TIMES, June 1, 2012, at
MB1.
THE
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raise the specter of isolating lower-income families and providing
them with fewer services, adversely impacting household outcomes.
Less obviously, a similar dynamic also exists at the regional level,
although the focus is on wages rather than on the mix of public
services and property taxes. Employment opportunities are not
evenly distributed across the country, and the same is true of higherwage jobs.52 Even if every local government accommodates a
proportionate share of the region’s lower-income households, the
region as a whole may not bear a fair share of the nation’s lowerincome households. And that simply replicates the conventional
exclusionary zoning problem at the regional level, where wealthy
regions—primarily on the coasts—are able to use regulatory burdens
to limit affordability.53 This, in turn, means that an increased number
of lower-income households remain where they are (primarily in the
South and Midwest), contributing less to the regional tax base and
straining public infrastructure.
Ganong and Shoag provide one useful way for thinking about
regional exclusion.54 They examine the extent to which housing prices
capitalize inter-regional wage differentials. In their account, one
common path towards economic improvement for a lower-income
household is to move from a lower-wage to higher-wage region.55
Residential mobility in this country has largely fit this pattern, with
higher-wage regions exerting a kind of gravitational pull for people
seeking higher-paying jobs.56 But that pull exists only to the extent
that the wage differential is not fully capitalized into local property
values.57 If someone can achieve an additional $10,000 in annual
wages by moving from Alabama to New York City, but has to pay an
additional $10,000 in housing costs, then the value of the move is a
wash.
52. Tickamyer & Duncan, supra note 33, at 81 (1990) (detailing the
disproportionate amount of low-wage jobs in rural communities).
53. See Edward L. Glaeser & Joseph Gyourko, The Impact of Building
Restrictions on Housing Affordability 3–6 (Harvard Inst. of Econ. Research,
Discussion Paper No. 1948, 2002) (explaining that the coasts are the primary areas
where housing prices far exceed construction costs, and attributing that gap to zoning
and its artificial constraint on new construction).
54. Ganong & Shoag, supra note 35.
55. Id. at 2.
56. Id. at 2–3 (explaining that historically, workers of all skill levels moved to
areas with high nominal incomes).
57. Id. (linking escalating housing prices in productive places to the movement of
lower-skilled workers to areas with “low nominal income but high real income net of
housing costs”).
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According to Ganong and Shoag, the increased capitalization of
wage differentials in housing prices makes it more difficult for
workers to move up the economic ladder.58 It discourages residential
mobility and increases income inequality. And, importantly, it is due
in no small part—according to their paper—to the proliferation of
land use regulations in higher-wage jurisdictions.59
Regional
exclusionary zoning, then, is characterized by housing prices that
capitalize all or most of the relatively higher wages.
C. Modern Forms of Exclusion
Recognizing that residential exclusion occurs not only at a local
scale, but also at sub-local and regional scales, reveals surprising
variety in the forms that exclusion can take. Traditional exclusionary
zoning at the local scale consists, generally, of large-lot zoning in
outer-ring suburbs. By restricting density and constraining the supply
of developable land, suburbs can boost local land values, translating
directly into higher housing prices. When these conventional land use
controls are found to be impermissibly exclusionary, the intuitive
response is to call for more density.
But once the problem of exclusionary zoning is reframed using
different geographical scales, density is no longer a universal solution.
For instance, in neighborhoods experiencing a growing demand for
urban living, increased density may be leading to sub-local
exclusionary outcomes. The forms of exclusion identified below are
by no means comprehensive, but they nevertheless suggest the
breadth of the forms that modern exclusionary zoning can take when
sub-local and regional effects are included.
There is a sense in which zoning is always and inherently
exclusionary. To the extent it restricts supply—and that, after all, is
what zoning primarily does—it should have the effect of increasing
prices, at least as compared to the alternative of no density controls.60
But that is not quite right, because consumer preferences for different
levels of density will also affect property values, and may affect them
quite dramatically.61 Much of the writing on exclusionary zoning is
premised at least implicitly on a relatively static and familiar view of
58. Id. at 27.
59. Id. (“Though there has been a dramatic decline in income convergence
nationally, places that remain unconstrained by land use regulation continue to
converge at similar rates.”).
60. See, e.g., Glaeser & Gyourko, supra note 53, at 5–6.
61. See infra text accompanying notes 70–76.
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consumer preferences.62 All things being equal, people will prefer to
live in single-family homes with plenty of land. More land, in this
view, is always better and more valuable than less land. Density
restrictions that require more land per house are therefore catering to
consumer preferences at the same time that they are reducing the
supply of developable land. But there are signs that consumer
preferences are changing, at least in certain markets. The aging
population in the U.S. may well be driving some of these shifting
preferences.63 Younger populations are increasingly leaving suburbs
where older populations (ages forty-five and above) are heavily
represented.64 As a result, aging suburbs are experiencing slow
growth, or in some cases declines in their younger populations.65 On
the whole, suburbs are aging at a faster rate than cities, posing
broader questions about how to keep older and more established
suburbs relevant.66
Moreover, the resurgence of cities and the rise of New Urbanist
designs suggest that at least a segment of the population actually
prefers greater density.67 Recently, cities like Las Vegas, Raleigh, and
Charlotte are seeing sharp gains in their younger populations.68
Examining the population as a whole between July 2010 and July

62. See, e.g., Lehmann, supra note 15, at 230–31 (noting how wealthy households
tend to build “single-family homes on expensive multi-acre plots of land,” while
central cities disproportionately house lower-income families).
63. See WILLIAM H. FREY, THE UNEVEN AGING AND ‘YOUNGING’ OF AMERICA:
STATE AND METROPOLITAN TRENDS IN THE 2010 CENSUS 7–8 (2011) (describing
“aging in place” phenomenon, where seniors continue to reside in same post-war
suburbs they first settled with young families).
64. Id. at 11, 13.
65. Id. at 16–17.
66. Id. at 10–11.
67. See, e.g., Alan Ehrenhalt, Trading Places—The Demographic Inversion of the
American City, NEW REPUBLIC, Aug. 13, 2008, at 2–4 (detailing difficulties of
retaining urban middle class, and high costs associated with luxury urbanism).
68. FREY, supra note 63, at 14. However, the low national growth rate for people
below the age of forty-five, coupled with outmigration of young adult families and
children, have caused cities to experience greater declines in their younger
populations than suburbs between 2000 and 2010. See id. at 13–14; see also Kyle Fee
& Daniel Hartle, Growing Cities, Shrinking Cities, FED. RES. BANK CLEV. (Apr. 14,
2011), http://www.clevelandfed.org/research/trends/2011/0411/01labmar.cfm (finding
warmer temperatures, lower concentrations of manufacturing employment, and
higher household incomes explain the population growth in fastest-growing cities like
Raleigh, Las Vegas, and Austin)
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2011 shows that growth rates in larger cities are outpacing their
suburban counterparts in metropolitan areas across the country.69
A certain minimum density is required to support mass transit,
walkable commercial centers, and the kinds of vibrant mixed-use
communities that reflect modern design principles. While this, today,
may represent a modest share of consumer preferences,70 it is hardly
farfetched to think that more and more people, especially younger
people, will actively seek more dense housing options in cities, or in
suburban locales embracing modern urban design principles.71
Where that seeking occurs, large-lot zoning is likely to suppress,
not enhance property values. If the sprawling development patterns
that large-lot zoning generates become undesirable, such zoning will
put downward pressure on property values and actually increase
affordability. Even though the effect of the zoning is to reduce the
supply of developable land, it does so by necessitating a form of
development that people may not want. Unable to satisfy consumer
preferences, prices are likely to decrease, despite the restriction in
supply (or, more likely, the zoning will change).72 Indeed, in some
cities, the strong desire for density among younger families has driven
up urban housing prices to such an extent that they are now turning
to lower cost housing options in the suburbs—a phenomenon that
turns the suburbanization patterns of the 1950s and 60s on its head.73

69. See generally Nate Berg, Urban Versus Suburban Growth in U.S. Metros,
ATLANTIC CITIES (June 29, 2012), http://www.theatlanticcities.com/neighborhoods/
2012/06/urban-or-suburban-growth-us-metros/2419.
70. See David Ray Papke, Keeping the Underclass in Its Place: Zoning, the Poor,
and Residential Segregation, 41 URB. LAW. 787, 787–788 (2009) (explaining that the
“great majority of middle and upper-class Americans continue to live on the outskirts
of the center-cities and even more so in the surrounding suburbs,” while “the poor
and working classes continue to live in the older, postindustrial center-cities” despite
changing preferences for urban living).
71. See Alex Williams, Creating Hipsturbia, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 15, 2013, at ST1.
72. A similar story can be told regarding bedroom requirements. Local
governments would sometimes limit the number of bedrooms per unit in residential
development with the goal both of reducing the number of children, in absolute
terms, but also as a proxy for lower-income households. See, e.g., Span, supra note
12, at 19. Yet if wealthier households increasingly have a preference for larger
families, bedroom requirements could have the unintended consequence of
depressing property values. We thank Dana Brakman-Reiser for this suggestion.
For a similar dynamic, consider rental restrictions imposed by homeowners
associations, which—contrary to traditional assumptions—may drive down property
values in a strong rental market. See Brian Eason, Homeowners Associations Clamp
Down on Rentals, USA TODAY (Oct. 4, 2012), http://www.usatoday.com/story/
money/business/2012/10/04/homeowners-oppose-rentals/1614229/.
73. See Williams, supra note 71.
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Moreover, to attract younger families leaving the urban core, many
suburbs are encouraging high-density development to mirror the
urban form.74
There is still a sense in which zoning is inherently exclusionary by
design, but not simply because it reduces supply. Instead, the goal of
most zoning, fundamentally, is to preserve or increase property
values.75 Sometimes this comes from large-lot zoning, but sometimes
it comes from fostering or even requiring more dense mixed-use
development.76
This seems obvious enough, but it generates important implications
that are often missed. Opponents of exclusionary zoning frequently
object to large-lot zoning and push for greater density. But
municipalities that embrace greater density are almost certainly
betting that greater density will increase not decrease property values
and will actually limit affordability. Greater density by itself will not
necessarily result in lower property values if the new development
actually satisfies high-end consumers’ preferences.77 It also means
that the urban core is becoming a new location for exclusionary
zoning—or at least neighborhoods within the urban core.78 Yet the
form of the zoning is different—it may not be large-lot requirements,
but instead other regulatory controls that limit congestion or sublocal services. Zoning can be exclusionary even if it embraces

74. Id. (“[T]o ward off the nagging sense that a move to the suburbs is tantamount
to becoming like one’s parents, this urban-zen generation is seeking out palatable
alternatives—culturally attuned, sprawl-free New York river towns like Hastings,
Dobbs Ferry, Irvington and Tarrytown—and importing the trappings of a twee
lifestyle like bearded mixologists, locavore restaurants and antler-laden boutiques.”).
75. But see Yale Rabin, Expulsive Zoning: The Inequitable Legacy of Euclid, in
ZONING AND THE AMERICAN DREAM 101–21 (Charles M. Haar & Jerold S. Kayden
eds., 1989) (describing how industrial zoning can be intentionally designed to reduce
property values and displace minority communities).
76. See, e.g., James A. Kushner, Smart Growth, New Urbanism and Diversity:

Progressive Planning Movements in America and Their Impact on Poor and Minority
Ethnic Populations, 21 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 45, 45 (2002) (explaining how
smart growth and New Urbanism can lead to “the intensification of ethnic
separation,” “gentrification and displacement of the poor”).
77. See, e.g., Richard P. Voith & David L. Crawford, Smart Growth and
Affordable Housing, in GROWTH MANAGEMENT AND AFFORDABLE HOUSING
(Anthony Downs ed., 2004).
78. See James A. Kushner, Affordable Housing as Infrastructure in the Time of
Global Warming, 42/43 URB. LAW. 179, 206 (2011) (noting the success of transitoriented development has led to “secondary development [which] has the effect of
gentrifying the neighborhood as rents and property sales prices escalate to reflect the
new markets and result[s] in the displacement of lower income neighborhood
residents”).
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density, so long as the resulting housing values capitalize the value of
sub-local amenities.
Consider transit-oriented development (TOD).79 Many opponents
of exclusionary zoning decry development patterns that require
residents to rely on cars.80 They point out that cars are expensive to
own and operate, and that the absence of public transportation
options can effectively exclude lower-income workers from a
neighborhood.81 But it does not follow that the current push for
transit-oriented development is necessarily the solution. If housing
prices in transit-oriented developments capitalize most or all of the
transportation savings, then such developments provide little help for
lower-income households.82 Imagine, for example, that commuting by
car costs $200 per month on average. If housing prices in the transitoriented development are $200 per month higher to reflect those cost
savings as well as, perhaps, other less tangible benefits of mass transit,
then transit-oriented development is not necessarily less exclusionary.
In fact, recent studies on walkability and TOD suggest that more
walkable urban areas are commanding higher property values.83
Increasingly, too, sub-local control over land use can create
powerful exclusionary forces at the neighborhood level. The clearest
example is the relatively new phenomenon of the community
conservation district.84 It amounts to a kind of historic preservation
district without the need for historical significance, and it provides the
community with a layer of sub-local control over land use decisions.
This additional layer almost inevitably drives up the cost of
development because it imposes another regulatory hurdle, and
provides a particular vehicle for expressing sub-local NIMBY-ism.

79. Robert H. Freilich, The Land-Use Implications of Transit-Oriented
Development: Controlling the Demand Side of Transportation Congestion and
Urban Sprawl, 30 URB. LAW. 547, 550 (1998) (setting out key characteristics
associated with TOD, including density to support mass-transit and more walkable
neighborhoods).
80. See, e.g., TODD LITMAN, VICTORIA TRANSP. POLICY INST., TRANSPORTATION
AFFORDABILITY: EVALUATION AND IMPROVEMENT STRATEGIES 3 (2013).
81. See, e.g., Orfield, supra note 28, at 905.
82. See, e.g., BARBARA J. LIPMAN, CENTER FOR HOUS. POLICY, A HEAVY LOAD:
THE COMBINED HOUSING AND TRANSPORTATION BURDENS OF WORKING FAMILIES
13, 17 (2006).
83. See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER B. LEINBERGER & MARIELA ALFONZO, BROOKINGS
INST., WALK THIS WAY: THE ECONOMIC PROMISE OF WALKABLE PLACES IN
METROPOLITAN WASHINGTON, D.C. (2012); Christopher B. Leinberger, Now
Coveted: A Walkable, Convenient Place, N.Y. TIMES, May 25, 2012, at SR6.
84. For a discussion of the phenomenon, see Fischel, supra note 41.
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Although the phenomenon is sufficiently new that studies have not
yet appeared examining the effect of community preservation districts
on affordability, it is at least easy to guess which direction the
pressures will go.
Neighborhoods can also capture significant control over sub-local
revenue through TIFs or special assessments, which can fund
neighborhood improvements and infrastructure development with
tightly concentrated benefits that do not extend to lower-valued parts
of the municipality. The same kind of exclusion can also occur with
school district line drawing.85 In short, neighborhood exclusion is
common and can take many forms.
At the regional level, exclusion consists primarily of the aggregate
effects of local exclusion.86 By and large, there is no regional
government that enacts exclusionary land use controls.87 Instead,
regional exclusion occurs when too many separate local governments
within a particular region enact exclusionary measures.
There is, however, a broader effect at work here that makes
regional exclusion more than simply the sum of the effects of local
governments’ uncoordinated actions. The problem relates back to
the dynamics around traditional inter-local exclusionary zoning. In a
region facing significant housing demand, especially demand for
affordable housing, exclusionary zoning by one local government
imposes a kind of region-wide inter-local externality, forcing other
local governments to bear a disproportionate share of lower-income
households. Importantly, though, that effect is not static. Instead, the
more local governments within a region adopt exclusionary measures,
the more pressure it puts on the remaining local governments to do
the same.
Moreover, the more common exclusionary regulations become
within a region, the more knowledge local officials are likely to have
about the form that such regulations take. Intra-regional information
networks between local planners and zoning officials will often lead
to a kind of regional convergence in the content of local zoning

85. See supra text accompanying notes 47–51.
86. See, e.g., Quinn, supra note 11, at 148–49 (noting the cumulative effects of
exclusionary zoning at the local level).
87. Francois Vigier et al., Ad Hoc Regionalism: Managing Growth Through
Spatial Planning—Learning from the American Experience, J. CROSS BORDER STUD.
IRELAND , Mar. 2006, at 63, available at http://www.crossborder.ie/pubs/journal1.pdf
(“[T]he management of spatial growth through zoning and other development
controls is the responsibility of local governments.”).
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codes.88 This convergence is not a coincidence, and the result, again,
can be widespread exclusion at the regional level. As exclusion
afflicts an entire region, the problem again surfaces in a range of
landscapes. Cities that are already supplying a sizeable amount of
affordable housing may nevertheless be contributing to a region-wide
shortage of affordable housing in an area rich with employment
opportunities.89 The new frontiers of exclusion call for rethinking
conventional remedies for exclusionary zoning.
III. REJECTING AN ORDINANCE-C ENTRIC FOCUS
Concerns about exclusionary zoning are not primarily about
density limits, nor even about affordability in the abstract. Rather,
the central worry is about the extent to which land use controls at any
scale prevent lower-income households from accessing economic
opportunity and quality public services. Zoning, when too restrictive,
forces people to disgorge most or all of the value of living in a place in
the form of higher housing prices. That is not to say that everyone
should be able to live everywhere they want, but it is to say that if
exclusion is too widespread at any level—regional, local, or sublocal—it can exacerbate wealth and income inequality, and make the
distribution of public services even more inequitable.
The question of when zoning becomes too restrictive is entirely
dependent on the underlying market context.
Consider the
conventional story of suburban exclusion detailed in Part I.
Exclusionary zoning was originally about post-war inner-ring suburbs
enacting large-lot zoning, density limits, and regulatory requirements
increasing the costs of development.90 These early post-war suburbs
were therefore largely unaffordable to the poor. Fast forward thirty
years, however, and affordability of housing options is not high on the
list of problems facing some of these same inner-ring suburbs.91

88. Id. (presenting examples of ad-hoc regionalism, including “voluntary
association[s]” of neighboring local governments “facing common growth
management issues”).
89. See Ganong & Shoag, supra note 35, at 22 (“The U.S. is increasingly
characterized by segregation along economic dimensions, with limited access for most
workers to America’s most productive cities.”).
90. See supra text accompanying notes 9–15.
91. See, e.g., Sugie Lee & Nancy Green Leigh, The Role of Inner-Ring Suburbs in
Metropolitan Smart Growth Strategies, 19 J. PLAN. LITERATURE 330, 330 (2005)
(“Current metropolitan trends of spatial decentralization may serve to increase the
economic vulnerability of skipped-over inner ring suburbs since they have neither the
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In fact, leapfrogging development, in which the affluent continue to
push farther and farther outside of urban centers, has led to
disinvestment from some of these early inner-ring suburbs.92 Even if
zoning ordinances continue to impose minimum lot sizes and exclude
forms of multi-family development, housing prices are low enough
that they are accessible even to lower-income families. In suburbs
surrounding Detroit, to take the most extreme example, people can
buy houses for as little as $2500—which is a fraction of the roughly
$10,000 cost of demolishing a house—but the decrepitude of the
neighborhoods and the lack of services means that few people want to
move.93 The impact of the zoning ordinance has therefore changed
over time. Even widespread use of characteristically exclusionary
devices will not make housing unaffordable in places people do not
want to live. Traditionally exclusionary provisions in a zoning
ordinance do not make the ordinance exclusionary in fact.
The point is a general one. In places without meaningful
development pressure, exclusionary zoning ordinances have little
effect on affordability. Many rural municipalities have extremely
large lot zoning, often justified on environmental grounds, and they
are not unaffordable as a result. In the absence of meaningful
development demand, density restrictions are likely to have little
effect.
But dense urban neighborhoods can also be exclusionary if they
are not dense enough. Zoning that permits dense, multi-family
housing is often not on the radar as potentially exclusionary, but it
can be. Height limits, or limits on the floor-area-ratio,94 can still
significantly constrain supply relative to the given demand, even in
neighborhoods with truly urban density.95 And simply adding density
may not make a dent in exclusionary outcomes if that new

centrality and attraction of the central cities nor the attractive residential
environments of outer ring suburbs at the metropolitan fringe.”).
92. Id.; see also Wendell E. Pritchett, Beyond Kelo: Thinking About Urban
Development in the 21st Century, 22 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 895, 909 (2006) (noting how
inner-ring suburbs struggle with shrinking tax bases as residents opt for newer areas).
93. See The Cost of Demolishing a House in Detroit, MARKETPLACE (Jan. 29,
2013),
http://www.marketplace.org/topics/wealth-poverty/cost-demolishing-homedetroit.
94. This is a measure of density employed in New York City, referred to as FAR.
N.Y.C.,
N.Y.
Zoning
Resolution,
art.
I
§
12-10
(2013),
http://www.nyc.gov/html/dcp/html/zone/zonetext.shtml. For a discussion on the
mechanics of FAR, see ARMSTRONG ET AL., supra note 48, at 3–4.
95. ARMSTRONG ET AL., supra note 48, at 7 (explaining how downzonings “may
limit owners’ ability to capitalize on the development capacity of their lots”).
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development capacity is not directed at affordable housing
development. Again, the underlying market context is determinative
when assessing the problem of exclusionary zoning and the proper
remedy.
More provocatively, increased density can even increase property
values if it better satisfies consumer preferences. This is not
farfetched. Greater density—at least in certain contexts—can lead to
greater availability of services, from public transportation, to Whole
Foods and Starbucks. These familiar incidents of gentrification mean
that greater density can decrease affordability, depending on local
market conditions.96
Nevertheless, many continue to identify exclusionary zoning
exclusively by reference to specific zoning provisions abstracted from
market pressures on the ground.97 Moreover, if the market is ever
considered in the context of exclusionary zoning challenges, it is
typically confined to the affordable housing needs in and around the
municipality, rather than the dearth of affordable housing in an entire
region, or the unmet affordable housing needs at the neighborhood
scale.
Courts, in particular, tend to be dismissive of the market forces
operating at various scales when analyzing whether an ordinance is
impermissibly exclusionary.98 Even courts that have imposed fair
share obligations on municipalities have not done so in response to
inter-regional concerns, but only inter-local ones.99 Similarly, courts
rarely touch upon the possibility of sub-local exclusion, and its
consequent denial of a meaningful opportunity to access the quality
public services offered within a municipality’s bounds. But as the
above discussion has underscored, sub-local and regional forms of
exclusion pose many of the same concerns as the more traditional

96. ASS’N OF BAY AREA GOV’TS, DEVELOPMENT WITHOUT DISPLACEMENT,
DEVELOPMENT
WITH
DIVERSITY
11-39
(2009),
available
at
http://www.bayareavision.org/initiatives/dwd-final.pdf (reviewing TOD projects in
California’s Bay Area communities and reporting that “most new TOD projects
serve upper-income households who can pay a premium to live in them”).
97. See infra text accompanying notes 98–121.
98. See, e.g., Associated Home Builders v. City of Livermore, 577 P.2d 473 (Cal.
1975).
99. Some courts have, however, highlighted the widespread adoption of
residential restrictions across states to limit the migration of low-income workers.
For instance, the dissent in Associated Home Builders v. City of Livermore noted
that “[t]he State of California made an abortive effort toward exclusivity back in the
1930s as part of a scheme to stem the influx of poor migrants from the dust bowl
states of the southwest.” 577 P.2d 473, 494 (Cal. 1975) (Mosk, J., dissenting).
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forms of exclusion at the local level.100 Courts should therefore adopt
more flexible spatial frames when evaluating how a particular
ordinance interacts with the market.
This is not to say that courts have been completely inattentive to
issues of scale in exclusionary zoning challenges. Courts have
expanded their spatial frame slightly to consider the problems of
inter-local externalities and region-wide cumulative impacts.101 And
this expanded view has uncovered exclusion that would have almost
certainly been missed from a purely localized analysis.102 An example
of this can be found in the divergent approaches to spatial framing
that the Northern District of California and the Ninth Circuit took in
Construction Industry Ass’n of Sonoma County v. Petaluma.103 The
ordinance there had limited the number of multi-family units that
could be developed over a five-year period in Petaluma, a suburb
outside of San Francisco.104 But, interestingly, the ordinance allowed
for some multi-family development where none had previously been
allowed.105 The ordinance also set aside a portion of that new
development for lower-income households. Testimony at trial
indicated that if Petaluma’s limits on multi-family housing were to be
adopted more widely across the San Francisco region, a serious
shortfall in housing would result.106 Furthermore, this burden would
fall disproportionately on lower income households within the region,
unable to access affordable units.107
The District Court expanded its spatial frame to consider the interlocal externalities and the cumulative impacts that such an ordinance
100. See supra text accompanying notes 77–89.
101. See, e.g., Berenson v. New Castle, 341 N.E.2d 236, 242 (N.Y. 1975) (reviewing
a municipal zoning ordinance in terms of local impacts and the needs and
requirements of the larger region).
102. However, widening the spatial frame does not always signify a willingness to
find an ordinance impermissibly exclusionary. See Ybarra v. City of Los Altos Hills,
503 F.2d. 250, 254 (9th Cir. 1974) (holding that availability of affordable housing
within the region defeated a challenge to the ordinance as exclusionary); Duffcon
Concrete Prods. v. Borough of Cresskill, 64 A.2d 347, 351 (N.J. 1949) (holding that a
bar to industrial development was permissible since there was suitable land within
the region for new industrial development).
103. 375 F. Supp. 574 (N.D. Cal. 1974), rev’d, 522 F.2d 897 (9th Cir. 1975).
104. 522 F.2d at 901.
105. Id. at 908 n.16.
106. Id. at 902.
107. Id. The ordinance was expected to operate to the detriment of the region’s
low-income population, even though the impact of the ordinance was to “increase[]
the availability of multi-family units (owner-occupied and rental units) and lowincome units which were rarely constructed in the pre-Plan days.” Id.
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might impose, and concluded that the limits on multi-family
development were impermissibly exclusionary.108 However, the Ninth
Circuit rejected the District Court’s broader spatial framing of the
ordinance, instead choosing to focus strictly on the ordinance’s impact
within the city lines.109 This spatially-constrained framing led the
Ninth Circuit to conclude that the ordinance could actually be
characterized as inclusionary, merely because it provided for some
new and affordable multi-family housing development.110
The Ninth Circuit’s approach improperly disassociates Petaluma’s
ordinance from the underlying market context. Whether Petaluma’s
ordinance is inclusionary or exclusionary depends entirely on the
market for affordable housing at various scales, as influenced by the
distribution of higher-wage jobs and public services. Even an
ordinance that takes affirmative steps to address affordable housing
needs may not go far enough to root out exclusion at the regional
scale.
Moreover, the ordinance should not be characterized without
considering where housing is likely to be developed at the sub-local
level. Notably, there was some discussion in the Ninth Circuit
opinion about how Petaluma’s ordinance planned for a somewhat
even distribution of multi-family housing across the city so as not to
cluster the new development in one isolated neighborhood.111 But
despite this acknowledgement, there was no express discussion of
sub-local exclusionary dynamics or the possibility of inequitable
distribution of municipal services.112
The swift characterization of ordinances without respect to
background market conditions is certainly not unique to the Petaluma
decision. In Associated Home Builders v. City of Livermore,113 the

108. 375 F. Supp. at 584–88.
109. 522 F.2d at 908 (reasoning that the question of regional impacts was better left
for the state legislature). However, the expectation of a state legislative response is
optimistic at best and misguided at worst. The state may be unlikely to respond to a
flourishing region that is passing off affordable housing burdens to neighboring areas.
In fact, states may have a strong incentive to silently shift affordable housing burdens
across state lines. This inter-state externality problem suggests that some forms of
residential exclusion may require intervention at the national level. And at that
scale, it is open to debate whether Congress or federal courts are best positioned to
rule on the exclusionary impacts of a land use regulation; the tables do not tip so
clearly against the courts.
110. Id. at 908 n.16.
111. Id. at 901.
112. Id.
113. 577 P.2d 473 (Cal. 1975).
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California Supreme Court fell into precisely the same trap as the
Ninth Circuit, characterizing an ordinance based on the content of its
provisions abstracted from market conditions.
The city of Livermore had flatly banned all new development for
an undetermined amount of time, without drawing the familiar
distinctions between expensive and affordable housing that are
conventionally characterized as exclusionary ordinances.114 Because
Livermore’s plan did not single out affordable housing development,
the court rejected any reliance on exclusionary zoning cases that
involved large lot zoning or other density limitations.115 The
California Supreme Court stressed how the impacts of an ordinance
are not coextensive with municipal boundaries, but in nearly the same
breath distinguished between ordinances that have more direct
wealth-based implications and those that do not.116 The irony is that
with a regional lens, this may be a distinction without difference. An
outright restriction on all new development could theoretically be far
more exclusionary for lower-income households in a region that
sorely needs more housing than an ordinance that overtly favors
single-family homes in an area where affordable housing demand is
weaker.
The larger point is that spatial framing can shed light on exclusion
at the regional or sub-local level, or it can obscure it when analysis is
confined to a local scale. A purely local focus only tends to capture
residential exclusion between municipalities. This observation is not
entirely new in the context of inter-local externalities. In 1969,
Professor Lawrence Sager observed the importance of looking
beyond the municipality for “an intelligent appraisal of the social
harm deriving from exclusionary zoning.”117
Indeed, a slight
broadening of the frame to consider inter-local externalities displays
the possibility of wholesale exclusion from a particular region. The
New Jersey Supreme Court’s decision in Mount Laurel is perhaps the
most famous for broadening its spatial frame in precisely this
fashion.118

114. Id. at 484.
115. Id. at 485.
116. Id. at 487.
117. Sager, supra note 15, at 793.
118. S. Burlington Cnty. NAACP v. Twp. of Mount Laurel, 336 A.2d 713, 727–28
(N.J. 1975) (“[T]he universal and constant need for such [low- and moderate income]
housing is so important and of such broad public interest that the general welfare
which developing municipalities like Mount Laurel must consider extends beyond
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While regional framing is one step closer to a more careful
exposition on the exclusionary zoning problem, courts continue to
cast remedies to exclusionary zoning in static terms and without the
right level of spatial nuance. An article published in this journal by
James Quinn in 1975 observed that even in cases where courts held
that municipalities have a legal obligation to provide their fair share
of affordable housing within a region, the concept of demand was not
expressed with any precision.119 Quinn referenced the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court’s decision in Appeal of Girsh,120 where the court’s
assessment of demand was based again on a purely localized measure:
whether there was a developer that wanted to pursue an affordable
housing project within the municipality.121
Although the Girsh court was attentive to how local ordinances can
frustrate regional migration patterns, its assessment of demand failed
to account for regional market conditions that might make affordable
housing development pressing, even without a developer that stands
ready to construct low-cost multi-family housing in the municipality.
Likewise, the demand assessment does not account for the prospect
of developers ghettoizing lower-income households by placing all new
development on the edge of a municipality. A developer may want to
build on a particular block, but that new apartment project might do
little to address the affordable housing problems facing lower-income
households at the sub-local level, and in fact, it might exacerbate sublocal residential exclusion.
Ultimately, then, it is important for courts and litigants to
recognize that the terms of an ordinance, standing alone, do not tell
the full story of exclusion. In one context, widespread density
restrictions may be making an entire region cost-prohibitive. In
another, it may be dense development patterns that impose
exclusionary pressures sub-locally. Therefore, courts need to break
away from longstanding conceptions of an ordinance’s terms; the
terms should no longer serve as the benchmark for residential
exclusion.
Instead, judicial interventions should involve a careful examination
of an ordinance’s interaction with the market at various geographical
scales. Without thoughtful spatial framing, courts will likely miss
their boundaries and cannot be parochially confined to the claimed good of the
particular municipality.”).
119. Quinn, supra note 11, at 159.
120. 263 A.2d 395 (Pa. 1970).
121. Id. at 399.
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exclusion at the regional and sub-local level, which is working
alongside local exclusion to deny lower-income households access to
higher-income producing regions, and quality public services. A
move away from ordinance-centric reasoning will make judicial
interventions more responsive to all forms of residential exclusion,
and more attentive to the actual needs of lower-income households
that suffer at the hand of such exclusion at regional, local and sublocal scales.
CONCLUSION
Traditionally, exclusionary zoning has been discussed and
analyzed as a problem of inter-local externalities. Yet a look at
exclusion from the perspective of lower-income households reveals
that the problem replicates itself across three geographical scales:
regional, local, and sub-local. As the value of high-paying jobs at the
regional scale, or public goods at the sub-local scale are more fully
capitalized into property values, lower-income households can no
longer take the most fundamental steps towards economic
empowerment. Courts and commentators must therefore look
beyond the content of the ordinance to uncover the extent to which
land use controls are operating across geographical scales to the
detriment of lower-income households.
The new frontiers of exclusion reinforce the importance of
geographical scale. Courts merely looking at conventional tools of
exclusion may mistake density as a remedy for exclusionary zoning.
There is a renewed interest in urban living, which means that the
growing popularity of density, in the form of New Urbanist or TOD
developments, may yield exclusionary outcomes. A consideration of
sub-local and regional exclusion reveals the myriad ways that
municipal decision-making and market forces drive up housing costs
and problematically inhibit the upward mobility of lower-income
households.

